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Abstract
Most ﬁnancial markets allow investors to submit both limit and market orders, but it is not always
clear what affects the choice of order type. The authors empirically investigate how the time
between order submissions, changes in the state of the order book, and price uncertainty inﬂuence
the rate of submission of limit and market orders. The authors measure the expected time
(duration) between the submissions of orders of each type using an asymmetric autoregressive
conditional duration model. They ﬁnd that the execution of market orders, as well as changes in
the level of price uncertainty and market depth, impact the submissions of both best limit orders
and market orders. After correcting for these factors, the authors also ﬁnd differences in behaviour
around market openings, closings, and unexpected events that may be related to changes in
information ﬂows at these times. In general, traders use more market (limit) orders at times when
execution risk for limit orders is highest or the risk of unexpected price movements is highest.
JEL classiﬁcation: D4, G1
Bank classiﬁcation: Exchange rate; Financial institution; Market structure and pricing
Résumé
Sur la plupart des marchés ﬁnanciers, les investisseurs peuvent placer aussi bien des ordres à
cours limité que des ordres au mieux, mais les raisons de leur choix ne sont pas toujours claires.
Les auteurs cherchent à établir empiriquement comment la durée séparant les ordres passés, l’état
du carnet d’ordres et l’incertitude des prix inﬂuent sur le rythme auquel se succèdent les ordres à
cours limité et les ordres au mieux. Ils ont recours à un modèle de durée conditionnelle
autorégressive asymétrique pour mesurer le laps de temps susceptible de s’écouler entre les ordres
de chaque type. Ils constatent que le nombre d’ordres au mieux exécutés, tout comme les
variations du degré d’incertitude des prix et de profondeur du marché, a une incidence sur les ﬂux
des deux types d’ordres. Une fois ces facteurs pris en compte, les auteurs observent aussi des
différences de comportement en début et en ﬁn de séance, ainsi qu’en présence d’événements
inattendus qui sont peut-être liés à l’arrivée d’informations sur le marché. En règle générale, les
opérateurs font davantage appel à l’ordre au mieux quand le risque d’exécution des ordres à cours
limité est élevé et à l’ordre à cours limité quand le risque de variations de prix inattendues est
grand.
Classiﬁcation : D4, G1
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Taux de change; Institutions ﬁnancières; Structure de marché et
ﬁxation des prix  1
1. Introduction 
In most financial markets, traders can choose between submitting a market order for 
immediate execution at the best available price or a limit order that specifies a price for execution but 
may take longer to execute.
1 Over the trading day, this provides traders with various means of 
accomplishing their objectives by submitting different types of orders. At each point in time, traders 
must decide whether to submit an order, which type of order to submit, and the price at which they are 
willing to transact. Since these decisions depend on the traders’ expectations, preferences, and market 
conditions, we expect to see corresponding changes in traders’ propensity to submit the different types 
of orders over the trading day. A key consideration in the trader’s choice of order type is how the 
speed at which market conditions change influences the trade-off between the immediacy of trade (or 
execution risk) and the cost (or price risk) of trading. 
In this study, we empirically investigate the role played by the time between order 
submissions and the impact of changes in the state of order book and price uncertainty on traders’ 
order submission decisions (the order type and the time between consecutive orders, and the duration 
of orders). From a theoretical perspective, the importance of the duration of order submissions is 
discussed in studies by Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) and Easley and O’Hara (1992), which suggest 
that the time between trades reveals important information about the future value of the asset. The 
functional role for time implied by the models used in these studies has been empirically investigated 
by several authors, including Engle and Russell (1997, 1998) and Cho and Nelling (2000). Our 
approach extends the existing studies by jointly investigating the order choice and the time between 
submissions, rather than examining only the decision regarding limit order choice (e.g., Cho and 
Nelling 2000) or examining only order submissions without distinguishing between market and limit 
orders (e.g., Engle and Russell 1997, 1998). We believe there is valuable information in both the 
duration of order submissions and the type of the previous orders submitted. This is captured using the 
                                                      
1 As a result, limit (market) orders protect against price (execution) risk, but at the expense of increasing the 
execution (price) risk faced by investors.   2
asymmetric autoregressive conditional duration (ACD) model developed by Bauwens and Giot (2000), 
which is an extension of the univariate duration framework of Engle and Russell (1998). 
Consequently, our ACD model more completely captures the endogeneity between these key aspects 
of the order submission decision. 
Most similar to our study are Hasbrouck (1999), Hollifield et al. (2002), and Ellul et al. 
(2003). Each of these studies considers the factors that influence the order submission decision. Our 
paper differs from these earlier studies in two respects. First, we explicitly model the information 
carried by duration since the last order. By modelling both the order type decision and the duration of 
the submission, our analysis can more clearly determine how past orders impact the submission of 
different types of orders over the trading day, and we can investigate differences in behaviour across 
“fast” markets, “slow” markets, and “normal” markets. As Hasbrouck (1999) suggests: “a fast market 
is not merely a normal market that is speeded up, but one in which the relationships between 
component events differ.” Second, none of these studies completely characterizes the impact of the 
state of the order book, especially the information carried by the cancellation of limit orders both at 
the best and off-best quotes. Ellul et al. examine only the submission and cancellation of the last type 
of order. Hasbrouck (1999) performs a descriptive analysis of the arrival processes of the two types of 
orders. Hollifield et al. (2002) explicitly estimate the trade-off between the execution risk, adverse-
selection risk, and price risk of submitting the two order types. There is no cancellation in their model. 
We extend these studies by examining the impact of submission of limit orders and the cancellation of 
limit orders both at the best and at the off-best quotes within a time interval. Thus, we more 
completely characterize the impact of the state of the order book.  
We investigate the order submission process in the context of the foreign exchange market 
using Deutsche Mark/U.S. dollar orders submitted on the Reuters 2000-2 electronic brokerage system. 
Since the system operates 24 hours a day, it allows us to investigate a wide variety of time-of-day 
effects and announcement effects that are difficult to study using data from equity markets, which the 
previous studies have used. We should note that the order book we examine is not completely open.   3
Only the best quote and the most recent transaction are observable; therefore, including the off-best 
quotes allows us to determine the extent to which traders get valuable information from other sources.  
Our results provide several interesting insights into traders’ decisions regarding order 
submission. Examining the impact of order type, we find that market orders (i.e., transactions) prompt 
the submission of both market orders and best limit orders. We find evidence of trades/market orders 
clustering but also inducing a cross-autocorrelation on the submission of limit orders. When we 
examine the arrival of ask orders and bid orders separately, we find that there is an increase in the 
number of limit orders submitted to the ask side of the market following an increase in the execution 
of bid-initiated market orders. We find that an unanticipated change in duration delays limit orders 
more than market orders. Assuming that unanticipated changes in the duration of orders is related to 
the arrival of information, we find that limit orders are more sensitive to information carried by 
duration than market orders, to avoid being picked off.  
We find that the information obtained from changes in the submission and cancellation of off-
best orders prompts the submission of both market and best limit orders. The fact that some of this 
information is not directly observable by traders suggests that they must have other information 
sources that are correlated with our measures for the off-best orders (e.g., the traders’ private customer 
base). The submission of best limit orders and market orders is more rapid following the submission of 
off-best orders on the same side of the market than it is for the opposite side of the market.  
Regarding the impact of withdrawing liquidity from the market, we find that the cancellation 
of limit orders at the best price and off-best price has very different effects on the submission of 
market orders. Cancellations at the best price delay the submission of market orders, because the 
cancellation at the best price widens the spread and withdraws depth at the best price, making market 
orders more costly. Conversely, cancellation at the off-best prices prompts the submission of market 
orders. Since the cancellation of orders at the off-best prices does not affect the best price and the 
depth at the best price, the cancellation does not directly raise the cost of submitting market orders. 
Rather, cancellation at the off-best price indicates that the trade-off between execution risk, adverse-  4
selection risk, and price risk changes could be correlated with a change in the valuation of the asset. 
Thus, market orders become more active. Finally, we find that even after adjusting for intraday 
seasonalities and other factors, the opening and the closing of the markets still have a fundamental 
impact on the choice of order type, which is consistent with the findings of Bloomfield, O’Hara, and 
Saar (2005). 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data set: the Reuters D2000-2 
electronic brokerage system. Section 3 describes the asymmetric ACD model and the hypotheses 
tested. Section 4 provides the results of the basic model, and section 5 extends the basic model by 
examining the bid side and the ask side of the market. Section 6 offers some conclusions. 
 
2. Data 
The data we use are for the Deutsche Mark/U.S. dollar exchange rate and are taken from the 
Reuters D2000-2 system. The D2000-2 is an electronic order book. Subscribers can see the best bid 
and best ask orders, the size supplied under those orders, and the recent transaction record. Although 
we can observe best and off-best orders being submitted and cancelled in the limit order book, market 
participants do not. They observe only the best orders and executed orders. They do, however, observe 
similar information from other sources; e.g., the Reuters’ EFX page as well as their own customer 
order flow. The data set covers the trading activity in the electronic broker market from the evening of 
5 October 1997 to midnight on 10 October 1997. The data set includes the price at which the submitter 
stands ready to buy or sell the currency, the exact time at which the order arrived, whether it is a limit 
order or market order, whether the order is initiated at the bid side or ask side, the entry and exit time 
of the order, and the quantity to be traded. Although these data cover only the electronic broker market 
and not the interdealer market, the best order and their associated quantity submitted are observable by   5
all market participants, whereas this information is not observable in the interdealer market.
2 In the 
interdealer market, traders contact other traders directly to arrange the transaction price and quantity. 
As a result, little is known about the interdealer trades (notable exceptions being Lyons 1995, and 
Evans and Lyons 2002a, b).  
We use the foreign exchange market because it is the largest financial market in the world, 
with trade occurring 24 hours a day. This limits problems caused by illiquid trading, information 
asymmetries, and errors in the measurement of microstructure characteristics. The foreign exchange 
market also allows us to study how the supply and demand for a highly liquid asset develop as 
liquidity increases and decreases with the opening and closing of markets. Overall, our data set 
consists of 130,526 submitted orders. Of the submitted orders, about 26 per cent are market orders and 
74 per cent are limit orders.
3 The proportions of the two order types vary through the day, as shown in 
Figure 1. Market orders and marketable limit orders are used mainly during active trading hours, 
probably because the increased liquidity at those times means that the orders have a greater likelihood 
of being fully filled with lower price risk. 
To limit the impact of periods of thin trading on our results, we focus on the order submission 
activities from 6:00 to 18:00 Greenwich Mean Time (GMT). During this period, we study the arrival 
of the best limit orders and market orders. Best limit orders are the orders with the highest bid price 
and the lowest ask price standing in the market. Our data set consists of 20,512 best limit orders and 
30,758 market orders submitted. We focus our analysis on the best limit orders for three reasons. First, 
the best orders are the orders, along with the most recent transaction, that are observable on the 
Reuters screen. Second, they have priority in trading. They are the prices at which investors stand 
                                                      
2 The relative importance of the electronic broker market is also increasing over time. In 1997, about 30 per cent 
of all U.K. and U.S. trading volume and 37 per cent of all Japanese trading volume was conducted using 
electronic brokers (BIS 1999), and by 2001 this had increased to over 67 per cent, 54 per cent, and 48 per cent,  
respectively (BIS 2002). 
 
3 We treat marketable limit orders as market orders. Marketable limit orders are limit orders where the quoted 
price is better than or equal to the best quotes existing in the market. This ensures almost immediate execution. 
   6
ready to trade in the market; our analysis therefore considers the factors that influence current trades 
and current prices. Third, some limit orders are submitted at a price far away from the best price (these 
are referred to as “off-best limit orders”). These limit orders represent information on future market 
conditions or dealers’ concerns about future market conditions, but do not necessarily provide 
information on the current value of the asset (the current price) and current market conditions. 
Because our model examines how the spread and the state of the order book affect the arrival 
of best limit orders and market orders, we provide summary statistics for the submitted orders, the best 
orders, their durations, and the spread from 6:00 to 18:00 in Table 1. Although our analysis focuses on 
the best orders, their characteristics are very similar to the overall orders submitted—the average is 
almost identical. The main difference is that the best orders are not as sensitive to outliers—the 
minimum (maximum) overall price is 1.7003 (1.8070), but for the best orders the range is much 
smaller: 1.7332 (1.7699). The average time between orders is about 1.7 seconds and, not surprisingly, 
the time between best orders is longer at around 4.2 seconds. Even though more than half of the orders 
are submitted within one second of the previous order, the longest duration between orders is almost  
3 minutes. The best bid-ask spread varies from the smallest possible spread, 0.0001,
4 up to 0.0054. 
Table 2 shows the correlation between the spread and our variables related to the changes in the state 
of the order book.  
We can clearly see some of the differences in these variables through the trading day in 
Table 3 and Figures 1 and 2. We divide the day into 48 half-hour time bins and report the sample 
mean of the variables within each time bin. Qualitatively, Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the most important 
seasonal changes in the foreign exchange market over the trading day. During the active trading hours 
(e.g.,  6:00 to 18:00), we can see that dealers submit proportionately more market orders than 
otherwise, and that orders are submitted most frequently around the opening hours of the European 
and New York markets. These results suggest significant seasonalities in the order submission process. 
                                                      
4 This is the smallest possible spread, since prices in the foreign exchange market are quoted to four decimal 
places.   7
Table 3 shows the frequency of best limit and market order submissions, off-best limit order 
submissions, best and off-best limit order cancellations, and the mean of the spread and durations 
during the active trading hours. Consistent with earlier studies, we find that there are more limit orders 
than market orders. On the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), Harris and Hasbrouck (1996) 
document that 54 per cent of SuperDot orders are limit orders, and Ross, Shapiro, and Smith (1996) 
report that, overall, the limit orders account for 65 per cent (75 per cent) of all executed orders 
(executed shares). The duration between orders is shortest at the opening hours of both markets and 
longest as the markets close. All of our variables have similarly distinctive seasonal patterns: they 
increase as the London and New York markets open, with a slight drop afterward and a significant 
decline around the closing hours. 
The changes in the time between the submissions of orders during the trading day may also 
contain valuable information regarding investors’ beliefs, market depth, and the price formation 
process. The ACD model allows us to formally examine the dependence of the order type decision and 
the duration on different microstructure factors while controlling for the significant intraday 
seasonalities. This is an advancement over other studies using aggregated data because they consider 
the order submission decision at specific intervals and thus are unable to capture many of the dynamic 
aspects of these relationships. 
 
3.  Model and Hypotheses 
3.1 Basic  model 
Our empirical model is chosen to examine the dynamics of traders’ order submission 
strategies. Since orders are submitted at irregular intervals and market conditions change continuously, 
we investigate the potentially important information in both the order submission times and market 
conditions. Although there is evidence in work by Engle and Russell (1998) to suggest that trades are 
intertemporally correlated, there has been little work to investigate the information contained in the   8
arrival rates of limit and market orders and how they depend on market characteristics. In this paper, 
we examine the actual arrival times of orders to investigate the dynamic impact of changes in such 
microstructure aspects of the market as price uncertainty and the state of the order book on the time 
between the submissions of different types of orders. We treat the arrival time of market or limit 
orders as a point process where the arrival times of the different types of orders are a function of our 
set of market characteristics. 
To focus on the impact of order type on the elapsed time between orders (duration), we use the 
asymmetric log-ACD model. The asymmetric model is essentially a competing risk model that allows 
us to explicitly characterize potential differences in the order submission processes for market and 
limit orders. In this model, the arrival processes of limit orders and market orders can have different 
reactions to the previous type of order submitted, the time since the last order was submitted, and our 
microstructure variables. In this framework, the conditional duration of the two types of orders is 
dependent on past information. The asymmetric ACD model is characterized by two states: market 
orders and limit orders. Let 
i t x  be the time elapsed since the last order,  1 − − = i i t t t x
i , where  i t denotes 
the arrival time of the ith order. To economize the notation, we will use  j t −  to denote  j i t − , j = 0, 1, 
…, I. In a competing risk model, the observed duration is the smallest duration between the two states. 
The realized state contributes to the likelihood function through its density, and the state that is not 
realized, or truncated, contributes to the likelihood function through the survivor function. More 
specifically, the asymmetric ACD model specifies that, conditional upon the state  {} mkt lmt yt , = , the 
observed duration,  t x , is a mixing process such that 
     { } mkt lmt y H y x E x t
y
t t t t
t , , ] , [ 1 = = − ε ,    (1) 
where the expected duration E[xt|yt, Ht-1] is a function of whether the order at time t was a market or 
limit order (the state denoted by yt), the information set available at time 
1 − i t  (Ht-1), and the innovation   9
t y ε  is an independent, indentically distributed random variable with positive support. Because we are 
using the log-ACD model, the expected duration takes the following form: 
    { } mkt lmt y y y H y x E t t t t t t t t , )), ( exp( ) ( ] , [ 1 = = Ψ = − ψ ,    (2) 
where  ) ( t t y ψ  is an autoregressive process of the order type  t y . To estimate this model, we need to 
assume a distribution for 
t y ε . The likelihood function we use is the Weibull distribution, as in Engle 
and Russell (1997, 1998) and Bauwens and Giot (2001). Some other studies using the ACD model 
have used the Burr distribution, because it is more general than the Weibull distribution (e.g., Melvin 
and Wen 2003). Nevertheless, we use the Weibull distribution because it is simpler for large models. 
Our asymmetric models are larger than those used in many previous studies, because we allow the 
order submission process to differ across order types. This requires each order type to have its own 
autoregressive process and therefore doubles the number of parameters to be estimated relative to the 
symmetric model. Further compounding the identification problem is our investigation of the 
influence of microstructure factors. The correspondingly large number of parameters makes the Burr 
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t ψ = Ψ . The autoregressive process conditional on a limit 
order,
lmt
t ψ , is given by 



















t t x ε ψ ) exp( =  and 
lmt
t I 1 −  is an indicator function that is equal to 1 if yt-1= lmt, and 0 
otherwise. We include a set of explanatory variables, zt, measuring changes in the supply of liquidity 
in the order book and the spread. More specifically,  we examine   10
•  the number of best limit orders cancelled from the ask side and the bid side of the market from t-2 
to t-1 
•  the number of off-best limit orders cancelled from the ask side and the bid side of the market from 
t-2 to t-1 
•  the number of off-best limit orders submitted on the bid and the ask side of the market from t-2 to 
t-1 
•  the best bid-ask spread at t-1  
The 
lmt ξ  are the coefficients on these factors. In addition, we include five time dummies, dt. We 
incorporate time dummies to capture the effects of the opening of the London market ( 1 d ) and the 
New York market ( 2 d ), the closing of both markets ( 3 d ), and two dummies to capture the effect of 
the period before ( 4 d ) and after ( 5 d ) the Bundesbank announcement.
5 The 
lmt θ  are the corresponding 
coefficients on the time dummies.  
Similarly, the autoregressive process conditional on the current order being a market order, 
mkt
t ψ , is given by 



















t t x ε ψ ) exp( =  and 
mkt
t I 1 −  is an indicator function equal to 1 if yt-1 = mkt, and 0 otherwise. 
The coefficients for the microstructure variables and time dummies in the market order autoregressive 
process are defined similarly to those for limit orders. 
The durations and other variables we use in this paper are scaled to remove the well-known 
time-of-day effects found in microstructure data. In our variables, we assume that there is a dynamic 
stochastic part and a deterministic part. The dynamic part changes as market conditions change, and 
the deterministic part considers patterns such as intraday seasonalities. Since we are most interested in 
the first component, we scale our data to remove the systematic intraday seasonalities. The method we 
                                                      
5 We provide more formal definitions of these variables in sections 3.2.4 and 3.2.5.   11
use follows Engle and Russell (1998) by comparing the current value with the average value for that 
value at that time of day. For example, let  t X  be the raw duration between orders, so that 
1 − − = i i t t t X
i . Since durations are known to vary over the day, we remove the intraday seasonalities 
in  t X  by calculating the adjusted duration,  t x , as proposed by Engle and Russell (1998): 






=   ,       ( 6 )  
where ) (t φ  is the time-of-day effect formed by dividing each day into 48 half-hour bins, averaging the 
durations within each bin, and then smoothing the average durations with a cubic spline. The choice of 
30-minute time bins follows that in Bauwens and Giot (2000).  
 
3.2 Hypotheses   
We examine how changes in price uncertainty and changes in the state of the order book affect 
the arrival of best limit orders and market orders. As Cao, Hansch, and Wang (2004) point out, the 
state of the order book carries important information about the asset and impacts the price discovery 
process. Our study extends upon their work in that, instead of looking at the depth of the limit order 
book, we examine the factors that account for the changes in its depth: both the cancellation and 
submission of limit orders. In addition, because the order book in our case is only partially open, we 
examine whether information unobservable to traders, the cancellation and submission of behind best 
orders, impacts the order submission process. Building on the existing market microstructure 
literature, we develop a number of hypotheses regarding the impact of our set of market characteristics 
on the order submission decision. 
3.2.1  How does the previous type of order affect the duration and order type? 
  Various empirical studies show that trades cluster. We examine how the previous type of order 
affects the arrival time of the subsequent order and the order type by examining the T and " 
coefficients. Equations (4) and (5) can be interpreted in an analogous fashion to a GARCH(1,1) model,   12
in that the dependent variable is a function of its lagged value and a lagged random-error term. The 
effect of the transition between states on duration is captured via the intercept, T, and the coefficient 
on the previous random error, ". The values of T therefore represent the effect of the previous order 
type on the current order type submitted. For example,  1 ω  and  3 ω  are the impact of previous limit 
orders on the expected duration of limit orders and market orders, respectively. A negative value of 
1 ω  ( 2 ω ) means that, following a limit (market) order, traders more rapidly submit limit orders 
(i.e., the duration decreases). The "’s are the autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) 
effects of the lagged disturbance from the previous order on the expected duration. If "1 and "2, for 
example, are different, the impact of the size of the disturbance from the last limit order on the 
expected duration for current limit orders depends on the lagged order type.  
3.2.2  How is duration affected by changes in the depth of the market? 
We examine how the submission and cancellation of limit orders affects the arrival time of the 
next order and the order type. These variables capture the state of the order book and are defined by 
the number of orders submitted or cancelled in the open interval between the arrivals of best orders. 
We use the number of orders because we believe that each order counts as a “vote” for future changes 
in market conditions (e.g., Lyons 1995).  
The first set of variables we investigate is the number of best and off-best limit orders 
submitted on each side of the market. These variables measure the role of increases in the supply of 
liquidity. An increase in the number of off-best limit orders submitted increases market depth and thus 
lowers the price risk of submitting market orders—the risk of walking up (down) the order book and 
paying a higher price for the marginal unit is smaller. Consequently, as the market depth and liquidity 
increase and therefore the price risk decreases, we expect to see a more rapid submission of market 
orders.  
The second set of variables we examine is the cancellation of best limit orders from the ask 
and the bid sides of the market. These cancellations withdraw liquidity from the market at the best   13
price, thereby either widening the spread or decreasing the market depth at the best price. Thus, the 
price risk of submitting market orders is higher, whereas the execution risk of submitting best limit 
orders decreases.  
The third set of variables we examine is the cancellation of orders at off-best prices. This 
withdraws liquidity at prices behind the best. Although this set of variables does not impact the best 
prices directly, it indicates that traders who were willing to bear execution risk at off-best prices are no 
longer willing to do so. This could reveal a change in the information set of the traders, thus carrying 
important information and impacting the submission of subsequent orders. Consequently, the 
cancellation of orders at off-best prices may convey different information than the cancellation at the 
best price, and traders may be more likely to submit market orders to avoid the increased execution 
risks at these times. 
3.2.3  What about price uncertainty? 
  To measure price uncertainty, we use a common measure of price risk—the best bid-ask 
spread. We use the difference between the highest bid and the lowest ask active in the market at time t. 
A wider bid-ask spread indicates an increase in dealer uncertainty and a less liquid market. Since a 
widening spread means that market orders cost more and there is a larger price impact on trades, we 
expect to see the payoff from submitting limit orders increase and the payoff from submitting market 
orders decrease as the spread increases. Similarly, Easley and O’Hara (1992) propose that when the 
probability of trading against an informed trader decreases, dealers are willing to quote tighter spreads, 
leading to less price risk and thus more market order submissions. Empirically, Peterson and Sirri 
(2002) find more market orders are submitted when spreads tighten. Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1995) 
and Ahn, Bae, and Chan (2001) find that limit order submission is impacted by market depth, price 
volatility, and quoted spreads. Harris (1998) finds that, as spreads widen, the cost of demanding 
liquidity and thus the reward for providing liquidity increases, and that more limit orders are therefore 
submitted. Consequently, as the spread increases, we expect the duration of limit orders to decrease 
and the duration of market orders to increase.    14
 
3.2.4  Does the opening and closing of markets fundamentally affect order arrival and order type? 
Although we correct for intraday seasonalities, we also incorporate a set of dummy variables 
in our model to capture systematic changes in trading activity in the periods surrounding the opening 
and closing of the markets in Europe and North America. Our adjustment of duration by the expected 
duration discussed earlier (in equation (6)) should, theoretically, remove the influence of intraday 
seasonalities in foreign exchange trading, but it is possible that there is more to the time-of-day effects 
for market orders and limit orders; we add dummy variables to capture these potential differences. An 
increasing number of studies suggest that the trading behaviour of market participants in various 
financial markets is different at these times (for a detailed discussion in the context of the foreign 
exchange market, see Dacorogna et al. 2001). Across the trading day, there are times more likely than 
others at which traders will submit orders (e.g., lunch hour in Japan and Europe are well-known times 
when trading activity decreases). Models by Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), Foster and Viswanathan 
(1990), and Brock and Kleidon (1992) suggest that traders focus on the openings when the value of 
information is highest and the closings when investors are trying to close their positions or protect 
themselves from risks associated with overnight volatility. Bloomfield, O’Hara, and Saar (2005) use 
an experimental asset market to investigate traders’ behaviour at these times; they find that informed 
traders demand liquidity early in the trading session by submitting market orders that hit existing limit 
orders, but that they start to supply liquidity as the day progresses. As a result, we expect to see an 
increase in the proportion of market (limit) orders at the start (end) of the day. 
To implement this test we examine the trading patterns for our market. Consistent with other 
studies of the foreign exchange market, we find that the peak trading hours fall into roughly two 
periods (e.g., Figure 2). Trading is most active from 7:00 to 10:00
6 during early trading in Europe and 
                                                      
6 All times are in GMT. 
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from 12:00 to 15:00 as North America becomes actively involved.
7 We also see a decline in trading 
activity as London and New York close between 16:00 and 18:00. These patterns may influence our 
results because the successful filling of an incoming order (whether a market or a limit order) depends 
very much on changes in the number of counterparties and the arrival of new information. For 
example, the opening of the New York market should deepen the existing market by introducing more 
possibilities of trade with new market participants. It may also increase the amount of information 
being incorporated into prices. Although these effects may be partially captured by changes in our 
microstructure variables and the scaling, recent studies suggest the possibility of fundamental changes 
around the opening and closing of markets; we therefore control for it. 
In our model, we include three dummy variables to capture the effects of increased and 
declining trading activity as these markets open and close. The dummy takes on a value of 1 if a trade 
occurs in the respective period, and 0 otherwise: 
  d1 = 1 if the order is submitted between 7:00 and 8:00 (GMT), d1 = 0 otherwise 
  d2 = 1 if the order is submitted between 12:00 and 13:00 (GMT), d2 = 0 otherwise 
  d3 = 1 if the order is submitted between 16:00 and 18:00 (GMT), d3 = 0 otherwise 
Even though several studies suggest that the time of day, especially the opening and closing of 
markets, influences traders’ order submission strategies, few studies have investigated this possibility. 
If we find asymmetric effects on the submissions of the two order types, then work that does not 
distinguish between the two order types or adequately correct for these periods may not accurately 
adjust for intraday seasonalities and its estimation would no longer be efficient. 
3.2.5  The effect of macroeconomic announcements on traders’ decisions 
  To examine the potential effect of important macroeconomic announcements on the order 
submission decision, we study the impact of an unexpected announcement following a Bundesbank 
council meeting on traders’ order submission decisions. On Thursday, 9 October 1997, there was a 
                                                      
7 The London opening is generally viewed as around 7:00 and the New York opening around 12:00. 
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regularly scheduled Bundesbank council meeting. The meeting started, as scheduled, at 11:00 (GMT), 
but the council unexpectedly announced an increase in the German interest rates afterwards at 11:30 
(GMT). Since these meetings are known to have a very significant impact on trading activity in the 
foreign exchange market (e.g., Andersen and Bollerslev 1998), we incorporate two dummies to 
capture the effect on market activities before and after the announcement:  
 d4 = 1 if the order is submitted between 10:30 and 11:30 (GMT) on 9 October 1997, d4 = 0 otherwise 
 d5 = 1 if the order is submitted between 11:30 and 12:30 (GMT) on 9 October 1997, d5 = 0 otherwise 
We can therefore study the differences in the submission of limit orders and market orders before and 
during the meeting as well as after the announcement; both periods are well known for their 
importance in the price formation process. We expect to see an increase in the use of market orders 
following the unexpected arrival of the new price-relevant information, because traders are concerned 
about execution risk as the price rapidly moves to its new equilibrium level. 
 
4. Results 
To determine the factors that influence the order submission decision, we examine the results 
of our estimated asymmetric ACD model in Table 4. The first two columns represent the estimated 
coefficients and t-statistics for our full model (equations (3) to (5)).  
4.1  The impact of the previous type of order submitted 
The T-coefficients represent the impact of the order type (e.g., whether the previous order was 
a limit or market order) on the time until the next order is submitted (i.e., the duration). We find that 
the estimated coefficient for the impact of the last order that is a limit order only has a significantly 
positive (0.2987) impact on the duration of current limit orders,  1 ω . Thus, traders are more hesitant to 
submit new best limit orders (i.e., limit orders that will improve the current price) when the previous 
best order was a limit order. Since such orders would compete with the other limit orders in the order 
book, this effect is consistent with the “crowding out” effect described in Parlour (1998): the time 
priority given to the limit orders already in the order book slows the arrival of new best orders.   17
Turning to the impact of previous market orders on the submission of subsequent orders, the estimated 
coefficients for the limit order equation and the market order equation,  2 ω  and  4 ω , are significantly 
negative (-0.0288 and -0.2209, respectively). These results indicate that when the last order was a 
market order, traders are more likely to submit both market orders and best limit orders. This 
complements the existing literature (e.g., Hasbrouck 1999), in that we find that not only do trades 
cluster,
8 but that their execution prompts the submission of best limit orders at the best price. Market 
orders erode depth at the best price, thereby lessening the competition of submitting best limit orders 
and increasing the profitability from supplying liquidity with limit orders.  
Regarding the ARCH effects, all of the estimated α’s are significantly positive. This indicates 
that disturbances or unexpected changes in the duration since the previous order was submitted 
lengthen the expected duration for the next order for all order types. More precisely, the longer the 
time since the last limit (market) order was submitted, the longer the time until the next best limit 
(market) order is submitted. Comparing the magnitudes of the estimated values for the α’s for the best 
limit orders with those for market orders, we find that the values for the limit orders are larger in 
magnitude. This suggests that limit orders are more sensitive than market orders to the previous 
disturbance in duration. Because submitting a new best limit order means providing liquidity at the 
most competitive price, traders tend to be more cautious about providing liquidity when there has been 
an unexpected change in the lagged duration. A potential explanation for this caution is that the 
disturbance could indicate the presence of an information event (e.g., Easley and O’Hara 1992), 
making traders more hesitant to submit limit orders. 
4.2  The persistence of order arrivals 
The estimated value for the autoregressive portion of the order submission process for limit 
orders,  $ 
lmt, is much smaller than for market orders, $
 mkt: 0.68 versus 0.95 in Table 4. Since 
                                                      
8 Market orders follow market orders, suggesting that the conditions that motivate traders to submit market 
orders are persistent at certain times. 
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likelihood-ratio tests reject the null hypothesis that 
mkt lmt β β ≥  at the 5 per cent significance level, 
this suggests that the changes in duration are more persistent and that order arrival is more clustered 
for market orders than for limit orders. More precisely, the longer (shorter) the time since the arrival of 
the last market order, the longer (shorter) the expected time until the arrival of the next market order. 
Limit orders, on the other hand, appear to be more evenly distributed over the trading day. 
The estimated Weibull parameters, γ, reveal the shape of the hazard function for market and 
limit orders. The estimated value for market orders, γ 
mkt, is less than one (0.86) in Table 4. A Weibull 
parameter of less than 1 means that the hazard is decreasing; therefore, conditional on the current order 
being a market order, the hazard function for subsequent market orders is decreasing. More precisely,  
the longer the period without a market order arriving, the less likely it is that a market order will be 
submitted (i.e., market orders are clustered). The Weibull parameter of best limit orders, γ 
lmt, is around 
one. Consequently, conditional on the current order being a limit order, the submission of best limit 
orders is less dependent on the time that has passed since the last best limit order was submitted. A 
likelihood-ratio test shows that 
lmt γ  is significantly greater than 
mkt γ ; this confirms our previous 
observation that market orders are more clustered at certain times of the day or during certain market 
conditions. 
4.3  The impact of changes in price uncertainty 
We next examine the effects that our microstructure variables related to price risk have on our 
estimated durations. We find that changes in the spread have the opposite impact on limit order 
submissions than on market order submissions. Further, the magnitude of the estimated coefficient on 
lmt
spread ξ  is roughly 6 times that on 
mkt
spread ξ , as shown in Table 4. Since 
lmt
spread ξ  is significantly negative 
and 
mkt
spread ξ  is significantly positive, this indicates that a widening of the spread prompts the 
submission of limit orders while slowing the submission of market orders. Our findings support 
Foucault (1999), who suggests that market orders are more costly when there is a larger bid-ask spread   19
and thus when there is larger price uncertainty; therefore, in equilibrium, a higher proportion of limit 
orders is submitted at these times.  
4.4  The impact of changes in the depth of the order book 
To study how changes in the supply of liquidity impact the duration of limit and market 
orders, we first consider the effect of changes in the number of off-best limit orders submitted, and 
thus the effect of changes in the depth of the order book. We find that an increase in the number of off-
best limit orders prompts the submission of both limit and market orders. The fact that the coefficient 
is significantly smaller for market orders (the likelihood-ratio test for equality gives a p-value of less 
than 1 per cent) suggests that increasing the liquidity in the market increases the submission of market 
orders more than it does limit orders. Since the submission of more off-best limit orders means that the 
potential price impact of a given trade is smaller, traders are more willing to submit market orders at 
these times. Intuitively, when a large market order is submitted, it may have to walk up the order book 
to be filled. The more off-best limit orders that have been submitted, the lower the cost (or potential 
cost) of walking up the order book. These results are consistent with more liquidity and lower price 
risk increasing the submission rate of market orders.  
To study the impact of the withdrawal of liquidity from the market, we examine both the 
cancellation of best limit orders and the cancellation of off-best limit orders. We find that an increase 
in the withdrawal of limit orders at the best price is associated with more active submissions of limit 
orders (both 
lmt
ask best cancelled , , ξ  and 
lmt
bid best cancelled , , ξ  are significantly negative), but slower submissions of 
market orders (
mkt
ask best cancelled , , ξ  is insignificant from zero while 
lmt
bid best cancelled , , ξ  is significantly positive), 
as shown in Table 4. Since the cancellation of best limit orders implies a less competitive environment 
for limit orders and therefore more price risk for market orders, this creates an opportunity for traders 
to profit from supplying liquidity to the market, and thus traders increasingly submit limit orders (e.g., 
Biais, Hillion, and Spatt 1995). This raises the price risk of market orders either by widening the 
spread or by decreasing the depth at the best price; therefore, there is an increased risk of moving up   20
(down) the order book to completely fill an order. As a result, we see fewer market orders being 
submitted. 
The cancellation of orders at off-best prices has quite a different impact on the order 
submission decision. Cancellation of off-best bid orders prompts the submission of best limit orders, 
but the cancellation of off-best ask orders has nearly no effect on the submission of best limit orders. 
On the other hand, the cancellation of off-best orders from both sides of the market prompts the 
submission of market orders. One possible explanation for this pattern in our results is that the 
cancellation of limit orders at the off-best price discussed above conveys different information than the 
cancellation of limit orders at the best price. Traders who originally placed off-best limit orders were 
more willing to bear execution risk (they were more willing to wait) or less willing to face price risk 
(by submitting market orders). The cancellation of orders at the off-best price signifies that traders are 
no longer willing to bear the execution risk at the existing off-best prices. This could be due to the 
following reasons: (i) the market prices are moving against them, so the execution risk at the present 
off-best price is increasing and it may be more favourable to submit a best limit order or market order; 
(ii) the market is more confident in the value of the asset, so adverse-selection risk drops and it is more 
favourable to submit best limit orders; and (iii) there is more depth at the best price, so price risk drops 
and submitting a market order is more favourable. All three motives reveal information to other 
market participants regarding potential changes in the valuation of the asset; therefore, cancellation at 
off-best prompts submission of orders, particularly market orders. 
4.5  The impact of the opening and closing of markets 
  Our results around the opening and closing of markets are similar to the experimental results 
of Bloomfield, O’Hara, and Saar (2005). We find that limit orders and market orders respond 
differently to the opening of markets. Even after correcting for changes in market liquidity and price 
uncertainty, we find that traders are more hesitant to submit limit orders at the opening of markets and 
more hesitant to submit market orders at the closing of markets. The coefficients corresponding to   21
limit order submissions at the opening of the two markets, 
lmt
open London θ  and 
lmt
open NT θ , are both positive 
(with 
lmt
open London θ  significantly positive at the 1 per cent level and 
lmt
open NT θ  significantly positive at the 
10 per cent level). Since the potential asymmetry of information between traders or differences in the 
interpretations of information across traders is greatest at the beginning of the trading day, this is 
consistent with traders being concerned that limit orders have a higher probability of being “picked-
off” at those times. This is a form of the “winner’s curse,” as discussed in Easley and O’Hara (1992) 
and Glosten (1994). 
At the closing of the market, on the other hand, more limit orders are used. This may be a 
result of trading over the day revealing information on the value of the asset so that its price converges 
to the full information value. Consequently, there is less risk of being picked off at the closing of the 
market and limit orders are submitted more readily. This is in line with the suggestion that traders 
submit limit orders at the end of trading to close their positions and protect themselves from 
“overnight” volatility. In general, the opening and closing effects are much larger for limit orders than 
for market orders: the coefficients
lmt
open London θ , 
lmt
open NY θ , and 
lmt
close θ  are larger in both magnitude and 
statistical significance than their counterparts in the market order equation. Thus, it appears that the 
factors that influence the submission of limit orders are more sensitive to time-of-day related effects 
than to market orders.  
4.6  The impact of macroeconomic announcements 
  A unique feature of our data set is that it enables us to study the effect of an important 
macroeconomic announcement on the order submission decision. On Thursday, 9 October 1997, the 
regularly scheduled biweekly Bundesbank council meeting started at 11:00 (GMT) and ended at 11:30 
(GMT). Immediately following the meeting, the Bundesbank unexpectedly announced an increase in 
its repo rate from 3 per cent to 3.3 per cent. Since this action was unexpected, we are able to examine 
how the order submission decision appears to change around such events. The estimated coefficients   22
for our dummy variable before the announcement, 
lmt
to 30 : 11 30 : 10 θ  and 
mkt
to 30 : 11 30 : 10 θ , are not significantly 
different from zero. This is consistent with comments from market participants that the announcement 
was unanticipated and thus order submission activity was normal (e.g., Carlson and Lo, forthcoming). 
After the announcement, however, there was a significant increase in the submission of both market 
orders and limit orders. Though the magnitude of the estimated coefficients was similar for both 
market and limit orders, the level of statistical significance suggests that there was a larger increase in 
the submissions of market orders. 
  Our time-of-day variables allow us to extend the existing empirical and theoretical work. After 
correcting for the influence of changes in liquidity, price risk, and market seasonalities, we continue to 
find important factors that influence the order submission decision. Around the opening of markets 
and following unexpected announcements, there may be significant information asymmetries that 
result in the more rapid submission of market orders. Traders are concerned that limit orders will be 
“picked off” as the price adjusts to the new information and the price attains its new equilibrium value. 
When the level of information asymmetry among traders decreases, however, the traders appear more 
willing to submit limit orders. These findings are an interesting complement to our previous results 
and to the existing results in the literature. 
 
5.  The Ask and Bid Sides of the Market 
In the previous section, we focused on the arrival process of all best limit orders and all 
market orders. Since we find some differences in how changes in our factors on each side of the 
market influence the overall order submission decisions, the question arises as to whether the arrival 
process of the two order types differs across the bid and the ask sides of the market. In this section, we 
examine how information on the same and opposite sides of the market affects the decision to submit 
the two order types. To accomplish this, we estimate two separate models for the arrival process of the 
two order types: one on the bid side and the other on the ask side of the market.    23
Because the previous model did not distinguish between the side of the market for the market 
orders and the best limit orders, we add two new variables to our model of the expected duration of 
best limit order and market orders: the number of best limit orders posted and the number of market 
orders executed on the opposite side of the market. The coefficients are indicated by   side opposite   best, ξ  and 
 side opposite   mkt, ξ , respectively, as shown in Table 5. These variables are added because the arrival of best 
orders and market orders on the opposite side of the market may have a different impact than when 
they are arriving on the same side of the market as traders submit their orders. This model allows us to 
examine several interesting questions: 
What has the greatest influence on the supply of liquidity at the best price: the previous submission of 
best limit orders or market orders/transactions? An increase in the submission of best limit orders on 
the opposite side of the market appears to prompt the submission of best limit orders. The magnitude 
of the effect is more than three times as large and the statistical significance is much larger than for the 
impact of the execution of market orders on the opposite side of the market. The null hypothesis 
lmt
 side opposite   best,
lmt
 side opposite   mkt, ξ ξ ≥ on both the bid and the ask equations is rejected at the 5 per cent 
significance level using likelihood-ratio tests. This result suggests that an increase in the supply of 
liquidity at the best price on the opposite side of the market prompts traders to increase the supply of 
liquidity more than when there is an increase in the quantity of transactions on the opposite side of the 
market. As a result, an increase in liquidity on one side is related to an increase on the other, and 
therefore to an increase in overall market depth. There is, however, a smaller effect if there was a 
consumption of liquidity on the other side of the market. 
These results are in contrast to the impact of changes on the same side of the market. 
Regarding the coefficient related to the submission of best limit (market) orders on the same side of 
the market, ω1 (ω2), the results suggest that an increase in these orders tends to delay the submission of 
best limit orders, possibly due to the “crowding out” effect (or fear of being “picked off”). We find   24
little impact of previous limit orders on the same side on the current market orders (ω3), but market 
orders on the same side appear to result in the clustering observed in the previous section. 
How do transactions cluster? Clustering depends on the side of the market. For orders being submitted 
on the ask side of the market, a previous market order on either the same or the opposite side prompts 
the submission of ask market orders. This is indicated by significantly negative estimated coefficients:  
4 ω  and 
mkt
 side opposite   mkt, ξ . Consequently, sell transactions (or market orders) cluster following transactions 
from both sides of the market. Interestingly, for the bid side of the market, it is only previous bid 
market orders that prompt the submission of bid market orders—the estimated coefficient on  4 ω  is 
significantly negative. The submission of previous ask market orders, 
mkt
 side opposite   mkt, ξ , does not have a 
significant effect. The difference between the effects on bid and ask orders is consistent with previous 
studies, which suggests that buying and selling behaviours differ. Bid market orders appear to cluster 
following transactions on the same side of the market (information related to the value increasing), but 
selling is more sensitive to overall information arrival.  
Does the submission of the behind best ask and the behind best bid limit orders have the same impact 
on the order submission decision? Again, such submissions depend on the side of the market. For the 




bid best off , , − − =ξ ξ , so the behind best bid and behind best ask submissions have the same effect on 





bid best off , , − − =ξ ξ  cannot be rejected. 
For the bid side of the market, an increase in the number of off-best limit orders submitted on 
the bid side of the market tends to prompt the submission of both more best limit orders and market 








bid best off , , − − ≥ξ ξ  at the 5 per cent significance level. Thus, bid orders are more sensitive to   25
changes in market depth related to the movement of behind best orders from the same side of the 
market than from the opposite side of the market.  
Do cancellations at the best quoted price and cancellations at prices behind the best quoted price have 
the same effect? Interestingly, on the ask side of the market, the cancellation of best limit orders on the 
same side of the market has the opposite effect on the arrival of best limit orders than the cancellation 
of off-best limit orders. Following an increase in the cancellation of orders at the best price on the 
same side of the market, we observe an increase in the submission of limit orders, as evident in the 
significantly negative
lmt
ask best cancelled , , ξ  in the ask equation. Cancellation at off-best quoted prices on the 
same side of the market has the opposite effect: 
lmt
ask best off cancelled , , − ξ  is significantly positive in the ask 
equation.  
To investigate why the withdrawals of liquidity at best and off-best prices have opposite 
effects on the decision regarding ask limit order submission, we study the first-order autocorrelation 
between prices, volatility, and the state of the order book (Table 6). We divide the trading day into  
1-minute intervals and use the frequency of the submission and cancellation of limit orders within the 
intervals. The price trend is defined as the difference in the mid-quote of the prices at the beginning 
and end of the 1-minute interval. The price trend has a value of 1 if the difference is positive, -1 if the 
difference is negative, and 0 if the price stays the same. We find that, following an increase in prices, 
the number of ask cancellations at the off-best price drops, but the cancellation at the best price rises. 
This suggests that the cancellation of orders at the best and off-best quotes occurs for different 
reasons. For example, when the price increases, the number of cancellations at the ask increases to 
avoid adverse selection, whereas the number of off-best cancellations drops to take advantage of the 
drop in execution risk. Submitting a best limit ask order when the cancellation of best orders increases 
leads to less competition and also less execution risk when the price is increasing. On the other hand, 
more ask orders are cancelled at the off-best prices when prices drop. Thus, traders submitting a best   26
limit order at this time have to offer a lower price and, if the price drops further, the execution risk 
increases.  
Regarding market orders, cancellations at the best and off-best prices also have different 
effects. We find that the cancellation of orders at the best quote on the same side of the market delays 
the subsequent submission of other market orders. Cancellation at the best price on the same side of 
the market means that traders are wary of facing adverse-selection risk at the best prices. The 
increased activity on the same side of the market suggests an upcoming change in the valuation of the 
asset. As a result, it is more risky to submit market orders at these times. On the opposite side of the 
market, for both the bid and ask equations, we see that the number of cancellations at off-best quotes 
prompts the submission of market orders. Cancellation at off-best bid prices is associated with an 
increase in mid-quote prices. It therefore appears that ask market orders arrive to sell as the price is 
inreasing. Similarly, cancellation at off-best ask is associated with a drop in mid-quoted prices, so bid 
orders arrive to buy at a lower price.  
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have examined the impact of price risk and changes in the supply of liquidity 
on the market order and best limit order submission processes in the context of the foreign exchange 
market. Because of the potential differences in the characteristics of the order submission process 
across order types and the irregular duration of order submissions, we studied the problem using the 
asymmetric log-ACD model. This model allowed us to jointly study the time between the time of 
order submission and the type of order submitted. We have found that, conditional on the type of 
order, the expected duration until the arrival of the next order depends on the previous type of order 
submitted, changes in price risk, and changes in liquidity in the market. Further, we have found that 
these factors have different effects on the arrival process of best limit order and market orders. As a 
consequence, ignoring differences in the types of orders being studied and ignoring differences in the   27
types of orders traders submitted in the past may lead to a misspecification of the order submission 
process and therefore of the price formation process. 
Our research extends the existing work that studies how the order submission process depends 
on microstructure factors, by using a technique that allows us to more completely capture relevant 
aspects of the order submission decision. We have found that market liquidity and price uncertainty 
play a significant role in the order submission decision (the duration of when to submit orders and the 
type of order). Specifically, we have found that increasing price uncertainty and the withdrawal of 
liquidity prompt the submission of limit orders, whereas increases in the supply of liquidity prompt the 
submission of market orders. Further, even after correcting for these factors, we continued to find 
differences in behaviour around market openings and closings and unexpected events: traders use 
more market (limit) orders at the opening (closing) of the market and more market orders after 
unexpected economic announcements and thus unexpected price movements.  
Since many previous studies were unable to capture differences in order submission strategies 
across periods of changing order submission intensity, we have provided a valuable new perspective 
into the role played by market liquidity and price uncertainty in various aspects of the order 
submission decision. Unlike previous studies, we have been able to study the differences in quoting 
behaviour around market openings, closings, and unexpected economic announcements that 
compensate for the changes in order submission intensities, and have found that these differences, 
even after correcting for the impact of market liquidity and price uncertainty, suggest that information 
asymmetries and information shocks play a significant role in the order submission decision.  
Having seen how the choice of order type and trading process interact, one can start to extend 
the models we have examined to test a wider range of theoretical microstructure models. We have 
highlighted some of the areas where the order submission process is different across order types, as 
well as where they are similar. Further research can extend our findings to consider other hypotheses 
and develop new models to help explain some of these new findings.   28
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Quotes, Best Quotes, Durations, and Microstructure Variables 
 
This table lists the mean, standard deviation, maximum, minimum, and median values for several key 
variables using the data from the Reuters D2000-2 electronic brokerage system for the week of   
6–10 October 1997 from 6:00 to 18:00. We use the quote and best quote in Deutsche Marks per 
U.S. dollar. The durations are measured in seconds for both the quotes and best quotes. Spreads are 
quoted in Deutsche Marks per U.S. dollar.  
 
  Quote 
Quote of best limit 




Duration: quote of 
best limit orders 
and market orders  Spread 
Mean  1.7515 1.7514 1.7303 4.2037 0.0002 
Std  0.0074 0.0073 3.9658 8.0698 0.0002 
Median  1.7530 1.7528 0.7900 1.9900 0.0002 
Min  1.7003 1.7332 0.0100  0.01  0.0001 
Max  1.8070 1.7699 208.39 254.80 0.0054 
 
 
Table 2: Correlation of Microstructure Variables 
 
This table shows the correlation matrix between the spread and the variables, capturing the state of the 
order book.  
 

















Spread 1.00  -0.07  -0.05  -0.04  -0.03  0.05  0.05 
No.  ask  off-best    1.00 0.30 0.38 0.26 0.26 0.23 
No. bid off-best      1.00  0.28  0.39  0.23  0.25 
No. off-best ask 
cancelled      1.00  0.17  0.23  0.14 
No. off-best bid 
cancelled       1.00  0.15  0.22 
No. best ask 
cancelled        1.00  0.13 
No. best bid 
cancelled         1.00   31
Table 3: Limit Orders, Marketable Limit Orders, Market Orders, Duration between Quotes,  
and Microstructure Variables through the Trading Day 
 
This table shows the frequency of limit orders, market orders, off-best limit orders, order flow, and 
cancelled limit orders, together with the sample mean of spread, duration, and best mid-quote duration 
through the active trading hours using the data from the Reuters D2000-2 electronic brokerage system 
for the week of 6–10 October 1997. The trading day is divided into half-hour time bins and we 












































6:00  469 411 303 327 168 193 179 176  0.00030  10.06 
6:30  862  1054  976  1105  549 619 384 458  0.00021  4.81 
7:00  1091 2135 1972 2052 1113 1150  602  604 0.00019  2.90 
7:30  971  2016 2064 1977 1059 1105  628  602 0.00019  3.10 
8:00  969  2377 2292 2752 1285 1507  693  690 0.00017  2.85 
8:30  831  1868 1802 2018 1005 1099  563  520 0.00017  3.50 
9:00  675  1308  1598  1466  864 817 468 453  0.00016  4.67 
9:30  613  1272  1428  1248  734 711 421 457  0.00017  4.91 
10:00  574 996 973  1211  596 630 412 332  0.00018  5.91 
10:30  626 917 914  1051  537 644 348 388  0.00020  6.04 
11:00  825  1406  1255  1625  788 893 438 468  0.00024  4.18 
11:30  1125 2272 2025 2316 1186 1377  686  656 0.00032  2.80 
12:00  1237 2105 2118 2380 1200 1412  750  787 0.00022  2.81 
12:30  1327 2247 2583 2538 1467 1566  919  933 0.00022  2.61 
13:00  1412 2900 3542 3135 2007 1913 1031 1133  0.00020  2.20 
13:30  1182 1850 2224 2404 1265 1388  867  906 0.00019  3.06 
14:00  1339 2040 2451 2263 1413 1370  913  949 0.00021  2.76 
14:30  1232 1465 1637 1874 1008 1074  818  843 0.00023  3.44 
15:00  1061  884  1151  1124  661 813 602 665  0.00029  4.70 
15:30  622 400 472 597 322 388 341 365  0.00034  8.89 
16:00  457 275 277 314 191 220 207 214  0.00045  12.09 
16:30  334 145 136 160  93  114 142 176  0.00060  18.50 
17:00  305 149 111 175  88  128 151 123  0.00087  20.50 
17:30  373 122 129 170 101 143 170 161  0.00054  17.89 
   32
Table 4: Asymmetric Log-ACD Model 
 
Maximum-likelihood estimates of the asymmetric log-ACD models of duration. The model estimated  
is equation (3) using the data from the Reuters D2000-2 electronic brokerage system for the week of  




 Full  model   
Model with only 
microstructure 
variables  
Model with only 
time dummies 
               
   coefficient  t-stat   coefficient  t-stat   coefficient  t-stat 
1 ω   0.2987  14.05    0.2940  12.28   -0.0307  -4.35 
2 ω   -0.0288  -2.14    0.0161  1.04   -0.0369  -8.75 
1 α   0.3945  25.43    0.4385  25.49   0.2272  21.45 
2 α   0.4857  24.93    0.5145  25.45   0.1994  17.40 
lmt β   0.6752  44.22    0.6263  35.81   0.9409  192.06 
lmt γ    1.0022  211.71    0.9978  211.47   0.9995  213.03 
lmt
spread ξ    -0.0622  -26.73    -0.0716  -27.52      
lmt
ask best off , − ξ   -0.0136  -4.91    -0.0142  -4.78      
lmt
bid best off , − ξ   -0.0091  -3.28    -0.0107  -3.59      
lmt
ask best off cancelled , , − ξ   0.0000  0.00    0.0000  0.00      
lmt
bid best off cancelled , , − ξ   -0.0174  -6.92    -0.0166  -6.15      
lmt
ask best cancelled , , ξ   -0.0294  -11.88    -0.0303  -11.45      
lmt
bid best cancelled , , ξ   -0.0336  -13.69    -0.0338  -12.89      
lmt
open London, θ   0.0993  9.03         0.0225  6.75 
lmt
open NY, θ   0.0141  1.48         0.0022  0.83 
lmt
close θ   -0.3566  -20.97         -0.1007  -12.72 
lmt
to 30 : 11 30 : 10 θ   -0.0153  -0.75    -0.0019  -0.08   -0.0211  -3.33 
lmt
to 30 : 12 30 : 11 θ   -0.0506  -3.78    -0.0518  -3.53   -0.0068  -1.89 
3 ω   0.0030  0.43    0.0141  2.12   0.0303  5.78 
4 ω   -0.2209  -32.27    -0.2236  -33.12   -0.1391  -27.51 
3 α   0.2554  25.64    0.2481  25.37   0.1476  21.57 
4 α   0.2664  26.73    0.2635  26.85   0.1476  21.65 
mkt β   0.9486  275.07    0.9500  285.02   0.9644  360.91 
mkt γ    0.8618  248.14    0.8622  248.31   0.8579  248.24 
mkt
spread ξ    0.0096  10.64    0.0095  10.60      
mkt
ask best off , − ξ   -0.0206  -10.72    -0.0203  -10.59      
mkt
bid best off , − ξ   -0.0218  -10.85    -0.0210  -10.53      
mkt
ask best off cancelled , , − ξ   -0.0104  -5.80    -0.0107  -6.01      
mkt
bid best off cancelled , , − ξ   -0.0105  -5.78    -0.0107  -5.95      
mkt
ask best cancelled , , ξ   0.0008  0.44    0.0003  0.17      
mkt
bid best cancelled , , ξ   0.0066  3.62    0.0056  3.12      
mkt
open London, θ   -0.0073  -1.81         -0.0030  -1.22 
mkt
open NY, θ   0.0005  0.14         0.0010  0.43 
mkt
close θ   0.0346  5.58         0.0176  4.46 
mkt
to 30 : 11 30 : 10 θ   0.0040  0.50    0.0020  0.27   0.0047  0.97 
mkt
to 30 : 12 30 : 11 θ   -0.0546  -9.89    -0.0529  -9.99   -0.0291  -8.23 
Likelihood  -94004.18     -94399.26     -95156.8       33
Table 5: Asymmetric Log-ACD Model for the Ask Side and the Bid Side of the Market 
 
Maximum-likelihood estimates of the asymmetric log-ACD models of duration. The model estimated  
is equation (3) using the data from the Reuters D2000-2 electronic brokerage system for the week of  
6–10 October 1997.  
 
 
 Ask      Bid   
   coefficient  t-stat   coefficient  t-stat  
1 ω   0.4249  13.83    0.4207  12.05   
2 ω   0.0143  0.63    0.0621  2.61   
1 α   0.4492  16.34    0.4617  16.41   
2 α   0.5496  18.70    0.5282  17.57   
lmt β   0.5568  23.64    0.5687  22.90   
lmt γ    0.9115  152.68    0.9186  151.83   
lmt
spread ξ    -0.0505  -19.15    -0.0466  -19.97   
lmt
 side opposite best, ξ   -0.0322 -8.62    -0.0277 -7.63   
lmt
 side opposite market, ξ   -0.0082 -1.89    0.0050 0.89   
lmt
ask best off , − ξ   -0.0126  -2.67    -0.0096  -1.59   
lmt
bid best off , − ξ   -0.0098  -2.54    -0.0260  -7.31   
lmt
ask best off cancelled , , − ξ   0.0084  2.65    -0.0013  -0.37   
lmt
bid best off cancelled , , − ξ   -0.0044  -1.31    0.0023  0.70   
lmt
ask best cancelled , , ξ   -0.0098  -3.26    -0.0062  -1.73   
lmt
bid best cancelled , , ξ   -0.0050  -1.40    -0.0065  -2.19   
lmt
open London, θ   0.1385  6.38    0.1160  5.66   
lmt
open NY, θ   0.0434  2.27    -0.0122  -0.67   
lmt
close θ   -0.4859  -15.42    -0.5067  -15.88   
lmt
to 30 : 11 30 : 10 θ   -0.0085  -0.21    -0.0677  -1.77   
lmt
to 30 : 12 30 : 11 θ   -0.0396  -1.55    -0.1466  -5.50   
3 ω   0.0889  6.72    0.0151  1.10   
4 ω   -0.3168  -29.74    -0.2925  -28.52   
3 α   0.3141  21.89    0.3333  21.63   
4 α   0.3427  24.02    0.3636  24.43   
mkt β   0.9026  130.37    0.9052  129.85   
mkt γ    0.7557  175.84    0.7684  177.48   
mkt
spread ξ    0.0068  5.17    0.0087  6.39   
mkt
 side opposite best, ξ   0.0100 3.27    0.0142 4.62   
mkt
 side opposite   market, ξ   -0.0168 -5.40    -0.0001 -0.03   
mkt
ask best off , − ξ   -0.0127  -3.63    -0.0224  -4.66   
mkt
bid best off , − ξ   -0.0155  -5.00    -0.0331  -12.13   
mkt
ask best off cancelled , , − ξ   -0.0014  -0.59    -0.0143  -5.31   
mkt
bid best off cancelled , , − ξ   -0.0112  -4.43    0.0006  0.22   
mkt
ask best cancelled , , ξ   0.0096  3.85    -0.0002  -0.08   
mkt
bid best cancelled , , ξ   -0.0032  -1.11    0.0147  5.96   
mkt
open London, θ   -0.0129  -1.43    -0.0158  -1.78   
mkt
open NY, θ   0.0028  0.36    0.0025  0.31   
mkt
close θ   0.0394  2.88    0.0953  6.46   
mkt
to 30 : 11 30 : 10 θ   0.0327  1.76    -0.0234  -1.30   
mkt
to 30 : 12 30 : 11 θ   -0.0959 
-
8.28169    -0.0791  -6.71   
Likelihood 
-
44438.2612     -46244.95        34



































change, t-1  0.0046 0.0078 0.0058 0.0063 0.0287  -0.0256 0.0114  -0.0069  -0.0117  0.0159 
 
Volatility 
price trend>0,  t-1  0.0195 0.0348 0.0357 0.0454 0.0683  -0.0131 0.0446 0.0225  -0.0035  0.0485 
 
Volatility 
price trend<0, t-1  0.0283 0.0224 0.0456 0.0137  -0.0038 0.0661 0.0170 0.0444  0.0474  0.0061 
 
Volalility 
price trend=0, t-1  0.1033 -0.0948 -0.1266 -0.0708 -0.1071 -0.0744 -0.1001 -0.0907  -0.0627  -0.0697 
   35
Figure 1:  
This graph shows the proportion of all orders submitted in each half-hour time bin that were limit 
orders and market orders using the data from the Reuters D2000-2 electronic brokerage system 





Figure 2:  
This graph shows the average number of orders submitted in each half-hour time bin using the 
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